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BOARD COMPOSITION AND CONTROL: AN EXPLORATORY ANALYSIS OF 
ORGANIZATIONAL CRISIS AND PREVENTION 
William Donoher, Bradley University 
Despite ext~1~sive scholarsl~ip on the subject of board control, the scandals of recent years suggest the 
need to reVIStt our assumptwns - and our theories - regarding alternative board control mechanisms. This 
study uses an _exploratory factor analysis comparing firm s that successfully or unsuccessfully avoided 
governance fatlure and the onset of crisis to assess the consistency of board stmctures. Results indicate 
that ther~ is some c~nsistency among the successful firm s, but that in genera/no common structural form 
can be ltnked to either success or failure. Thus, general rules cannot be relied upon, and a context-
specific approach to govemance should be developed. 
INTRODUCTION 
Agency theory 's insights into the implications of the 
separation of ownership and control (Fama, 1980 ; Fama 
& Jensen, 1983a, 1983b; Jensen & Meckling, 1976) 
sparked significant interest in governance structures and 
the abili ty to delimit managerial authority . One of the 
more important aspects of governance, and one attracting 
increasing attention, is the board of directors, which is 
charged with exerting control over management on behalf 
of the ftrm 's shareho lders (Fama & Jensen, l 983a). A 
prodigious body of li terature inve ti ga ting boards' 
performance of the contro l function has developed (see , 
e.g. , Daily et al. , 1999; Dalton et al. , 1998; Johnson, 
1996; Johnson, Daily & Ell strand , 1996; Pearce & Zahra , 
199 1; Zahra & Pearce, 1989), and with it expectations 
regarding board structures appropriate to the exerc ise of 
control. Despite such advances, and, increasingly, firm s' 
implementation of many of these structural fom1s (e.g., 
Bhagat & Black, 2002 ; Hoskisson et a l. , 1994), we have 
witnessed an unpara lle led number of scanda ls and 
blunders in recent years that clea rly impl y that 
observance of fom1 is not necessaril y a prerequi s ite to 
success. 
C learl y, something is wrong, but the question of 
whether the fault li es with inadequate contro l systems or 
merely inappropriate implementation remams 
unanswered . And thi s que li on, in tum , raises the 
additiona l issue of whether our theo ri es and presc ripti ons 
themselves are complete and suffi c ientl y exp lanatory in 
all circumstances. ln fact, severa l empiri ca l anal yses 
suggest that our understandin g of the e ffects of board 
stTucture and compositi on is, at best, incompl ete (e.g .. 
Dai ly et al. , 1999; Da lton et a l. , 1998; Deutsch. 2005 : 
Rhoades et al. , 2000). Moreover, no resea rch has directl y 
assessed these characteri sti cs in the contex t of spec ific 
instances of governance failure in order to understand 
how contTol mechan ism , and con·espond ing theory, 
might differ fTom one conditi on to another. 
Thi s m1icle attempts to addre s these issues by 
examining the extent to which board stm ctures are 
s imilar or different among fim1s facin g vanous 
governance challenges. If our cunent theories produce 
uniform e ffects, there shou ld be no differences among 
successful fim1 s in any context. L ikewise, those finns 
experienc ing crisis and governance fai lure should have 
simil ar forms and stmctures among themselves, which in 
tum should differ fro m those of successfu l fim1s. This 
consistency hypothesis underlies the fo llowing research 
question and the focus of thi s study: 
Research Question: Will stmctural fonm be 
consistent among successful fim1s and di stinct 
from unsuccessful fim1 , regard le s of context and 
c ircumstances? 
U ti I izing an exploratory factor ana lysis, a technique 
that fac ili tates theoretical development in circumstances 
in which isting theory is unsettl ed or in which issues 
rema in un reso lved (Stevens, 1996). to asses the effects 
of board composition (Bhagat & Black, 2002; Johnson, 
Hoski s on & Hitt. 1993: Zahra & Pearce, 1989), equity 
ownershi p among di rec tors (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; 
Hoski sson er a l. 1994). and board tenure (Golden & 
Zajac, 200 l ; Westpha l & Fredrickson, 200 l ). this study 
exa mines two independent samples that c1pture d ifferent 
types of govemance failure and organizational crisis. By 
exa minin g the factor structures of these three major board 
con trol indicators in each setting, we can begin to 
develop stronger theory rega rding the kinds of board 
charac teristics that may successfully con·elate with 
positive fim1 outcomes in such cond itions. The article 
begins by rcvie\ ing the re levant literature on board 
contTo l. after \\'hich the study's methodology and results 
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are presented and di scussed and implications for theory 
and practice are considered. 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Since Berl e and Means ' ( 1932) seminal work, 
scholars have come to understand that the separation of 
ownership from management resul ts in an efficient 
division of labor, but s imultaneously pre ents a contro l 
and incenti ve problem commonly refen·ed to as the 
"agency problem" (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Because 
they cannot diversify their empl oyment capita l, managers 
can be expected to make deci sions designed to en hance 
their employment security or other persona l interests 
(Amihud & Lev, 198 1). In order to avoid the nega tive 
consequences of such decisions, then, improved 
monitoring and control o f executive behavior must be 
achieved, and strengthening the board of direc tors is a 
critically important means of achi eving improved contro l 
(Wa lsh & Seward, 1990). But the board " is not an 
effecti ve device for dec ision control un less it limits the 
dec ision di scretion of individual top managers" (Fama & 
Jensen , 1983a: 314) . Implic itly, thi s means that the 
dec ision management and control functions must be 
separated, just as ownership and control are separated. 
The key to the board 's ab ility to monitor and contTo1, 
then, must be independence from management (Da il y & 
Schwenk, 1996; Johnson, Dail y & Ell strand, 1996). 
Although boards may be expec ted to perform a variety of 
ro les (Johnson, Dail y & Ell strand , 1996), it is the 
fu nction of independent control that remains most 
important fro m the standpoi nt of shareholder protection 
(Fama & Jensen, 1983a) . 
As a consequence, the role of the board also has been 
studi ed in a variety of contex ts, such as restructuring 
(e.g., John on , Hoski sson & Hitt, 1993) , takeove r 
de fenses (e.g, Da vis, 199 1; Mahoney et a l. , 1997 ; 
Ma llette & Fowler, 1992 , Sundarmurthy et al. , 1997), and 
R&D investment (Baysi nger, Kosnik & T urk, 199 1 ). 
Broadly speaki ng, the research has, cons istent wi th the 
agency-theoretica l perspective , focused on identifi ca tion 
of the factors that contribute to board independence and 
shareholder protecti on. T hi s study foc uses upon three 
such facto rs (compositi on, ownership and tenure) abo ut 
wh ich some di spute ex ists or fo r which inconsistent 
res ults have been found . 
T he proportion of unaffi liated outsiders sitting on the 
board has rece ived a grea t dea l of attenti on in both 
theore ti ca l and empirica l research (e.g. , Bhagat & Bl ac k, 
2002; Da il y & Schwenk, 1996; Johnson, Dail y & 
Ell strand , 1996; Johnson, 1-loski sson & Hitt, 1993; Za hra 
Journal o f Business and Leadership: Research, Practice, and Teachi ng 
& Pearce, 1989). Outsiders, to the extent lacking direct 
relationshi ps with managers and the day-to-day 
operations of the firn1 , "act as arbiters in disagreements 
among in ternal managers and carry out tasks that involve 
serious agency problems between internal managers and 
[shareholders]" (Fama & Jensen , 1983a: 315). Despite 
some empiri cal evidence supporting the existence of an 
outsider-performance lin kage (Hill & Snell , 1988; Pearce 
& Zahra, 1992), the general pattern of results found in the 
literature is mixed at best (B hagat & Black, 2002; Dalton 
et al. , 1998, 1999; Rhoades, Rechner & Sundaramurthy, 
2000). Measurement issues may account for some of thi s 
divergence (Dai ly, Johnson & Da lton, 1999). But another 
body of research a lso supports the notion that outsiders, 
preci sely because of the ir lack of direct involvement with 
the interna l operations of the firm , tend to rely upon 
finan c ial control s that shift manageri al incentives in ways 
that may not comport with shareholder interests 
(Bays inger & Hoskisson , 1990; Beekun , Stedham & 
Young, 1998; Hill & Snell , 1988; Ho ski sson et al. , 1994). 
It is al so possible that the ex istence o f a reverse causal 
re la ti onship (i .e. , perforn1ance cau es changes m 
composition) mean that we are not asking the right 
questions to begin with (Johnson, Dai ly & Ellstrand , 
1996) . ln short, the prec i e e ffects of outside 
representation are not c lear, and ce1iainl y do not appear 
to be uni versa] or mono! ithic (Deutsch, 2005) . 
Consistent with agency theory, outside board 
members' equity ownership a lso is posited to increase the 
li ke lihood that boards will ac ti ve ly monitor the behavior 
of management (e.g., 1-l oski sson et a l. , 1994; Johnson, 
Hoski sson & Hitt, 1993 ; Kosni k, 1990). Here, too, the 
ev idence is somewhat mi xed. Board involvement in 
dec ision-making has been found to be associated with 
outs ide d irector eq ui ty ownershi p (Kosnik, 1990), but 
Johnson, 1-loski sson and 1-1 itt ( 1993) showed that such 
direc tors' ownershi p was assoc iated with low 
in volvement in re focusing. ln the latt er case, management 
itse lf init iated the action, and whil e thi s finding suggests 
that shareholder interests we re rea li zed, it does not full y 
supp01i the notion of direct contro l by the board. 
Tenure a lso can be an issue in determining the board 's 
abi li ty to proper ly constrai n manage ment on beha lf of 
shareho lders, but aga in the prec ise re lationship is unclear. 
In one view, tenure may be assoc iated with rigidity 
(Boeker, 1997; Finke lste in & Hambri ck, 1990; Katz, 
1982) , while another stream of researc h suggests that 
experience ari s ing from long service may be important 
(F iske & Taylor, 199 1; Hambrick & Mason , 1984). 
Go lden and Zajac (200 I) documen t a curvilinear 
re lat ionshi p between board tenure and change , whi le 
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Wiersema and Ban tel ( 1992) indica te a positive 
relationship. 
All of these perspectives, of course, emphasize 
absolute tenure, and the lack of consistency may suggest 
that the key to the relationship lies in the relative tenure 
between the board and the CEO. Studies have noted that 
directors may become, or at least feel , obligated to the 
CEOs responsible for their appointment (Wade, O 'Reilly 
& Chandratat, 1990; Westphal & Fredrickson, 2001), and 
therefore CEO power typically is sa id to increase with 
CEO tenure (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1989; Ocasio, 
1994). Thus, researchers have begun accounting for the 
proportion of board members appointed prior to the CEO 
(Sundaramurthy et al. , 1997; Westphal & Fredrickson, 
2001) in order to capture the extent of board 
independence. 
With this in mind, attention turns to an elaboration of 
the study ' s methodology . Thereafter, the results of the 
study will be presented and analyzed by looking at 
patterns that emerge both among successful and 
unsuccessful firms in both crisis conditions studied here, 
and by comparing across conditions (successful vs. 
unsuccessful firm comparisons). In keeping wi th the 
research question posed at the outset, if theory is uniform, 
successful firms in e ither sample should exhibit the same 
structures, which also should differ from the consistent 
structures found among the unsuccessful firms. 
METHODS 
The samples for the present study were drawn from 
firms forced to restate prior-year earnings for reasons 
other than mere error and those who declared Chapter II 
bankruptcy. The timeframes during which each set of 
circumstances was preval ent were not identica l, and 
indeed were almost consecuti ve. Thus, we can ga in 
insight into the board contro l characteristics that appear 
to facilitate success (or fai lure) between conditions and 
across time. The sample se lection and methodologica l 
approach applied to each are di scussed below. 
Restatement Sample and Data Collection 
The tidal wave of fin ancia l manipulations that has 
struck the business world in the past few years provides 
an opportunity to study governance in acti on. rn 
examining the role of boards of directors in these 
circumstances, we can assess the extent to which boards 
were, or were not, able to avert crisis in the form of 
managerial vvrongdoing and subsequent exposure to 
scandal. The restatement sa mple was identi fied by an 
electronic word search in Lex is/Nexis Business News for 
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reports of earnings restatements involving alleged fraud 
and pending or current legal action by the SEC or pri vate 
parties. By focu sing on reports in which fraud was 
alleged m connection with the ori ginal fina ncial 
statements, those cases involving presumably deliberate 
action could be isolated, rather than instances of purely 
technica l restatements. Companies were not included in 
the sample if such allegations of fra ud were 
unaccompanied by actual restatements. The yea rs 
between 1996 and 1999, inclusive, were selected as the 
timeframe for the study, since this period corresponded 
with generally increasing economic activity and market 
perforn1ance, during whi ch expectations, and 
performance pressure, were steadily rising. 
Following identifi cation of the restating firms , non-
restating matching organizations were identified using the 
primary sample ' s four-digi t SIC code, total assets, and 
number of emp loyees as matching criteria. Thi s type of 
design provides de facto control of a variety of inter-firm 
and extra-organizational influences . Data were matched 
on the basis of each firm's assets and employees in the 
year immediately proceeding the primary sample 's 
restatement period. Assets and employees were chosen 
as match criteria on the assumption that these tota ls were 
less likely than earn ings to have been subj ect to 
manipulation or mi sstatement. Where more than one 
possible match existed, the company closest in assets to 
the restating firm was chosen. After identifying the match 
and its data ava ilabi li ty for the relevant years , a similar 
word search for the matching firm was undertaken in 
order to ensure that it had not restated earnings during the 
sample frame. Matches were identified for a ll but two of 
the primary-samp le finns, yielding a total sample of 140 
companies , compri sed of 70 restating firms and 70 non-
restating finns. A separate means test indicated that no 
significant 1ifferences on the matching va riables existed 
between the two sets of firms. The same one-yea r lag 
procedure for data collection was applied to the non-
restating firm s, so that fu ll data were gathered for each 
company, both restating and non-restating, for the yea r 
immediate ly proceeding the restatement year . 
Bankruptcy Sa mple and Data Collection 
The bankruptcy samp le is composed of firm s 
experiencing fin ancia l di stress between 1990 and 1996 , 
inclusive, years during wh ich bankruptcy activity \\' ::J S 
s ignifi ca nt enough to make exa mination feas ible. 
(Bankruptcies occwTing in the yea rs 2000 and fo llowing, 
when bankruptcy ac ti vity accelerated again due to the 
implosion of sma ll, techno logy-oriented Fi nns, were 
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exc luded from the sample . Such firms tended to file for 
reasons substantially different than those involved in the 
ea rli er timeframe and their internal dynamics, including 
that of their boards, may we ll have been di stinct enough 
to skew the final sample and/or mask relationships among 
the variabl es had they been included.) The bankrupt firm 
sample was identified by revi ewing the Bankruptcy 
Yearbook and Almanac, an annua l publication of New 
Generation Research that provides a compendium of 
major bankruptcy developments and filin gs (Da ily, 
1996). Companies included in the sample were limited to 
those filing Chapter II reorganizations. 
Nonfi ling fillTIS were identifi ed using Compact 
D isc losure and CompuStat as data sources. Each 
bankrupt firm 's total assets, primary three- or four-digit 
SIC code and debt-to-asset ratio in the filing year was 
used to identi fy s imilarly s ituated finns with respect to 
s ize and industry, and therefore environmental 
condi tions, as well as leverage-rela ted di stress . As was 
true of the restatement sample, w here there was more 
tha n one poss ible match, the company c losest in assets to 
the bankrupt firm was chosen. A post-identification 
validity check revea led that no stati stica ll y significant 
difference in s ize or leverage ex isted between the two 
sets of firms. 
In several instances, no va li d matches on these 
measures existed , and according ly the bankrupt fim1 was 
exc luded from the sample. However, where matches were 
identifi ed , the matdling fillTI was cross-checked aga inst 
the Bankruptcy Almanac's li sts of bankruptcies in both 
precedi ng and subsequent years to ensure that the ma tch 
was not itself ei ther a reorganized firn1 currentl y 
operating o uts ide of bankruptcy or a fim1 that entered 
bankruptcy within three years o f the sampl e window. 
W here such was the case, the prospective match was 
excluded and a new match was sought. Thi s procedure 
resu lted in a total sample of 220 finns, compri sed of II 0 
bankrupt firms and 11 0 nonbankrupt firms. 
Measurement of Board Contro l Characteristics 
Common measures of board control re necting the 
con tTucts di scussed above were ca lc ul ated for bo th 
samp les . Outs ide director percentage was ca lcu lated as 
the ratio of unaffi li ated o uts iders (i.e ., those with no pas t 
or current persona l or profess iona l re lationships with the 
loca l organi zation) to tota l boa rd me mbers (Hoskisson e t 
a!., 1994; Johnson, Hoski sson & 1-litt, 1993). O utside 
director equity ownershi p was ca lc ul a ted by di viding the 
hares owned by such outs ide directors by total shares 
ou tstanding (e.g. , Hoskisson et a !. , 1994; Johnson, Dail y 
Joumal o f Business and Leadership : Research, Practice, and Teaching 
& Ellstrand, 1996). Consistent with the perspectives 
elaborated above, measures of absolute and relative 
tenure were calculated. Average board tenure (total years 
of experience divided by board size) and average outside 
director tenure (tota l years of outside director experience 
divided by number of outsiders) were the measures of 
abso lu te tenure used in the study (e .g., Golden & Zajac, 
200 I). Re lative tenure was calculated both as the 
percentage of directors appo inted prior to the current 
CEO (Sundaramurthy et a!. , 1997; Westphal & 
Fredrickson, 200 1) and as the average tenure of the board 
divided by the tenure of the CEO (Daily & Schwenk, 
1996; John on et al. , 1996). 
Analytical Method 
Based on the foregoing variab les, we conducted an 
exploratory factor analys is based on principal 
components, a technique des igned to identify a series of 
uncorrelated (between factors) linear combinations 
accounting for the maxi mum poss ible variance in the 
focal vari ab les. U nlike confim1atory ana lys is, principal 
components anal ysis does not spec ify an ex ante factor 
structure ; rather, a ll vari abl e loadings and the resultant 
identifiable factors are detem1ined purely by the variable 
va lues themselves. Jn thi s sen e, the approach is 
ex pl ora tory, and the obj ect is to assess variable 
combinations and factor structures in situations in which 
theory is unsett led or undeve loped (Stevens, 1996). 
In perfom1ing the ana lys is, fac tors w ith eigenvalues 
grea ter than one after Yarimax rotation (Kaiser, 1960) 
were reta ined. Individual factor loadings, representing the 
corre lati ons between the fa c tor and the variable, were 
considered significant if they were equal to or greater 
than tw ice the critica l va lue for corre lation s ignificance at 
the .0 I leve l (S tevens, I 996). 
For the restatement sa mpl e, th is cutoff (double the 
standard correlation coe ffi cient) is approximately .43 , and 
approx imate ly .35 for the s li ghtl y larger bankruptcy 
sa mpl e. Fina ll y, Bartlett 's test of spheric ity (Cooley & 
Lohnes, 197 I), which assesses corTelation among the 
popu lat ion variab les, was conducted as an additiona l 
va lid ity check. 
Results 
Tab les I and 2 present the correlation matTices for the 
re tatement and bankTuptcy sampl es, respectivel y. An 
exa minati on of these tab les revea ls interesting 
corre lati on between abso lute tenure and restatement 
act ivity (negat ive) and between relative tenure and 
bankruptcy (pos iti ve). These issues are di scussed in 
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greater detail below in conjunction with the results of the 
factor analyses. In passing, note that intra-factor variable 
correlations are not a necessity for the existence of viab le 
Joumal of Business and Leadership : Research, Practice, and Teachi ng 
facto rs (Nunnally, 1978), for the factor loadings in 
essence represent correlations between the vari able(s) and 
the latent construct (Stevens, 1996). 
Table 1: Correlations and Descriptive Statistics (Restatement Sample) 
Variable Mean S.D. I 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I .Restatement! .50 .50 1.000 
2.0utside director percentage .60 .2 1 .069 1.000 
3.0utside director ownership .05 .09 .021 .039 I 000 
4.Average tenure 7.39 5 18 -.308*** -.110 -. 162* 1.000 
5.0utside director tenure 5 23 4.49 -.254** .239** .002 .741*** 1.000 
6.Pct. appointed before CEO .39 .33 -.132 -.048 .146t .204* .268*** 1.000 
7.8oard-to-CEO tenure 1.8 1 2.32 -.08 1 -.109 .016 .249** .186 * .61 1 *** 1.000 
N 140. t Coded 0 (no) or I (yes) . 
t p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01' *** p < .00 1. 
Table 2: Correlations and Descriptive Statistics (Bankruptcy Sample) 
Variable Mean S.D. I 2 3 4 5 6 7 
! .Filet 50 .50 1.000 
2.0utside director ercentage .56 .20 .Oil 1.000 
3.0utside director ownershi p 04 .13 -.107 -.004 1.000 
4.Average tenure 8.05 5.01 .019 -.16 1 * -.06 1 1.000 
5.0utside di rector tenure 6.49 4.77 .028 .08 1 -. 108 .775*** 1.000 
6. Pct. appointed before CEO .2 1 .21 .146* 086 .098 -.05 1 -080 1.000 
7.Board -to-CEO tenure 1.4 1 2.13 .263*** .022 -.051 .123t .3 16* ** .303*** 1.000 
N 220. t Coded 0 (no) or I (yes) . 
t p < .1 0, * p < .05, ** p < .0 I , *** p < .00 I. 
Table 3: Results of Principal Components Analyses 
B kr an · uptcy 
Variable Factor I Factor 2 
Unsuccessful firms : 
Outside direc tor percentage .037 .005 
Outside director ownership .042 .017 
Average tenure .891 -.104 
Outside director tenure .912 .12 6 
Percentage appointed before C EO -.075 .915 
Board-to-C EO tenure .518 .577 
Eigenvalue 1.99 1 1.145 
Percentage of variance .33 2 . 191 
Successful firms : 
Outside direc tor percentage -278 .358 
Outside direc tor ownership -.243 .259 
Average tenure .954 -.127 
Outside director tenure .932 . 149 
Percentage appointed before C EO .040 .874 
Board-to-CEO tenure -0 15 .880 
Eigenvalue 1.988 1.706 
Percentage of vari ance .33 1 .284 
Table 3 shows the results of the princ ipal component 
analyses of the two samples, in each case showi ng the 
compan son between the unsuccess ful firms (those 
experiencing the event) and the ir matches (those avo idin g 
the event) . Beginning with the restatement sampl e, tabl e 
3 reflects the existence of three factors for both the 
restating and non-restating fim1s , but with divergent 
factor loadings. The non-restati ng firm s exhibit a relative 
tenure/ovmership fac tor (high loadings for percentage 
s amp•c Restatement s amnle 
Factor 3 Factor 4 Factor I Factor 2 Factor 3 
-.0 10 .993 .107 -.549 .065 
.974 -.01 3 -.077 -.00 1 .977 
. 137 -096 .895 .172 -.165 
-.048 . 187 .960 -.077 .058 
.092 .044 . 188 .798 .203 
-.25 1 -.099 098 .863 - 083 
1.040 1.006 2.0 17 1.514 1.009 
.173 .168 .336 .252 .168 
-.642 .148 -. 11 9 .897 
.759 -.261 .444 .522 
.079 .893 .145 -.192 
-. 11 9 .885 . 176 .324 
.105 .1-1 5 .862 .072 
-.087 .203 .830 -.093 
1.022 2.190 1.280 1.1 9 1 
. 170 .365 .21 3 .199 
appointed prior to the CEO and board-to-CEO tenure 
combined with a moderate level of ow11 ership at .44) that 
is di stinct from an absolute tenure factor (outside tenure, 
.885 ; average tenure, .893) . The third facto r combines 
ownership (.522) w ith outside representation (. 897). 
The pattem of loadings diffe rs fo r the restating fi rms. 
Although a similar absolute tenure factor exists (outside 
tenure, .960; average tenure, .895), ownership and 
re lative tenure ex hibit different effects. U nlike the co-
283 
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loading found with respect to ownership among the non-
restating fim1 s, among restaters ownership represents a 
s ingle-item fac tor (.977) . Re lative tenure is bipolar, with 
hi gh positive loadings for percentage appo inted prior to 
the CEO (.798) and board-to-CEO tenure (.863) and a 
negative loading for outside representation (-. 549). This 
suggests a pa ttern of hi gh relati ve tenure on boards with 
minima l outs ide presence. N=220 for Bankruptcy 
Sampl e, 140 for Restatement Sample. Factors retained if 
eigenva lue > I . Va lues represent factor loadings after 
Yarimax rotation . Loadings s ign ificant at 2 x correlation 
s ignificance critica l value (p < .0 I) in bo ld . 
DISCUSSION 
Thi s paper began by asking the question whether, in 
light o f recent events, we can conclude that our ex isti ng 
theoretical framewo rk regarding board control is 
complete or applicable in all c ircumstances. Despite 
con iderable attention to the ro le and importance of 
boards in conn·o lling management (Fama & Jensen, 
1983a), boards seemingly fa il ed to exerc ise appropriate 
oversight in many companie . Yet it is not precise ly c lear 
what differences, if any, exi ted in the control regi mens 
of either "good" or "bad" firm , and our theories wou ld 
seem to suggest that a uni fom1 di stinction can and should 
be drawn between such compan ies based on observation 
of certain structural fom1s . Such was the implication of 
the consistency hypothes is wi th whi ch the arti cle began. 
T he objective of thi s study was to incorporate a 
variety of board contro l characteri stics within an 
explora tory ana lyti ca l approach that would pem1it us to 
assess differential contro l patterns contributing to 
succe sful avo idance of cri s i . Broad ly speaking, as can 
be seen in table 3, the result of th is ana lys is suggest tha t 
different contro l patterns emerge bolh w ithin and 
between eac h of the two cri s is contexts examined. Post 
hoc MANOY A and regression analyses confirn1ed 
differences existed particul arly wi th respect to tenure, 
with the restatement samp le ex hib it ing p1i mary effects 
for ab ol ute ten ure and re lative tenu re exerting the 
1,rreatc t influence in the bankruptcy sampl e. Thi 
uggests that the answer to the research questi on upon 
whi ch thi s study focused is nega ti ve , and that the 
consistency h)'l1othesis is not suppo1ted. As d iscussed 
be low, it is al so poss ib le <.li ·cem s ituations ;n which 
adherence to the form of good gove rnance was 
111 adequate to pre vent the onset o f cri i Indeed, it may 
be that such finns engaged in a ce rtain amount of 
' ' indow-dressing behavior - or, poss ibl y, they be li eved 
the step they were taking, in themse lves consistent with 
Joumal of Business and Leadership : Research, Practice, and Teaching 
nonnative standards of governance, would successfull y 
help them avert future difficulties . Unfortunately, such 
was not the case. 
Beginning with the factor patterns observed among 
successful firms and among the unsuccessful companies, 
table 3 shows that more similarity exists among the 
fom1er than the latter, but that differences also exist even 
here. In both contex ts (bankruptcy and restatement 
activity), the firms ab le to avoid cri sis exhibited a clear 
board tenure factor, both in absolute and relative tem1s. 
As noted earli er, the literature is split with regard to the 
effects of tenure, but one stream (e.g., Fiske & Taylor, 
199 1; Golden & Zajac, 200 1; Hambrick & Mason, 1984) 
supports a knowledge perspective in explaining why, in 
ce1ta in circumstances at least, tenure may be bene fi cial. 
Spec ifica ll y, tenure faci litates the gathering of 
informati on and the development of perspective 
concerning the organization that may contribute to 
success. Board stabi lity, for example, has been found to 
be associated with po itive outcomes in other contexts 
(Crutchley, Gam er & Marshall , 2002). These fmdings are 
supported by the results observed here. 
There are, hov\ ver, interesting and important 
di tinctions between the two sampl es as far as outside 
director influence is concerned. In the restatement 
sampl e, successful finn s combine relative tenure (Daily 
& Schwenk, 1996; Sundaramurthy et al. , 1997; Johnson 
et a l. , 1996; Westpha l & Fred1ickson, 200 1) with outside 
director ownership . Thus, director independence based 
upon tenure relative to that o f the C EO is supplemented 
by actual authority as shareho lders, and by the incentive 
a lignment properti es asserted on behalf of equity 
ownership (Jensen & Meckl ing, 1976). Similarly, the 
non-bankrupt firms combined relative tenure with high 
outside d irector percentages. In other words, these firn1s 
re li ed more upon long-serving outs iders without 
ownership interests in the firm. T he key message seems 
to be that success ful firms coupled some forn1 of outside 
di rec tor parti cipation with tenure, which would seem to 
suggest that governance fai lure can be avo ided w ith the 
proper comb ination of independence and interest. 
The major di stinction between the two crisis contexts, 
apa1  from the forn1 of outs ide pa1 icipation combined 
with relati ve tenure, res ides in the outs ide director factors 
observed in each case . That is, in the restatement sampl e, 
success ful firms had both high levels of outsiders and 
hi gh leve ls of outs ide direc tor ow11ership , while in the 
bankruptcy samp le, uccess fu l firms apparentl y relied 
upon a few outsiders with s ignificant ownership stakes 
and other ou ts iders with long tenure . G ilson ( 1989, 1990) 
documented the tendency of outside directors (and 
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management) to depart from failing firms and for 
ownership to become concentrated, and the factor 
loadings observed in this instance are broadly consistent 
with his fmdings. Indeed, these owner-directors may 
represent significant owners seeki ng a voice on the board 
to protect and oversee their investments, whi ch may 
reflect the traditional view of incentive ali gnment via 
equity ownership (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) . The 
distinction between thi s case and that of the restatement 
sample firms suggests the ex istence of a contingency for 
which theory must account. 
By contrast, the unsuccessful finns exhibited less 
commonality in their factor patterns. Only a common, 
single-variable ownership factor is shared among these 
firms , with all others showing some vari ation between the 
two different crisis conditions. But note that in thi s 
respect ownership alone was not sufficient to forestall 
crisis. The unsuccessful firms thus may have been 
seeking the fonn of good govem ance without adopting 
other practices that mi ght ensure success. The same 
general tendency can be noted among the bankrupt firms, 
who also exhibited a separate outside director factor that 
was uncombined with ownership or any of the other 
variables . Bays inger and Hoskisson (1990) argued that 
some insiders are necessary to provide ri ch perspecti ve. 
Given this, it may be that the bankrupt fi1ms sought the 
legitimacy of hi gh outside representation at the expense 
of analytical depth and clea r understanding of the 
operational function s of the organi zation. 
Examining the pattern of factors between the two 
crisis conditions reveals important implications fo r 
tenure, ownership and outside invo lvement. Note first 
that similar board tenure loadings ac ross conditi ons exist 
for the restatement sample, but not for the bankruptcy 
sample. In the latter case, re lati ve tenure (board-CEO 
tenure ratio) loads with the absolute tenure va ri ables. 
Thus, unlike the companies in the resta tement sampl e, the 
bankrupt firms ' boards combine both high leve ls of 
absolute tenure with higher levels of tenure compared to 
that of the CEO, suggesting CEO turnover. T hi s, of 
course, is not an uncommon occurrence among di stressed 
firms (Daily, 1996), and may suggest that , far from 
becoming inhibited by a threat-rigidity response (Staw. 
Sande lands, & Dutton, 198 1 ), these fim1 s may have 
undertaken too much change for their own good. When 
manag ing cri s is, in other words, too much turnover 
among management teams and boards may inteJTu pt 
knowledge deve lopment and appli cation that could 
benefi t the firm and contribute to surviva l. However, the 
similari ty in tenure loadings in the restatement sample 
between the success ful and unsuccessful Cim1s gives 
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some pause to conclusive ly findin g for board tenure as a 
pre ferred governance mechani sm. The post hoc analyses 
a lluded to above di sclose the ex istence of di fferent tenure 
effects between the two cri sis conditi ons that provide 
add iti onal gloss on these observations: relati ve tenure had 
the greatest influence in the bankruptcy sample while 
abso lute tenure was predominant in the restatement 
samp le. The latter may suggest a power or authority 
interpretation , while the former may invoke an issue of 
resources, part icularl y given the apparent simultaneous 
emphasis on outsiders (e.g ., Dai ly, 1996) . Add itional 
theoretica l deve lopment of these relationships clearl y is 
necessary. 
Likewise, comparing results for ownership and 
outs ide representation across the samples confim1s and 
extends the conclusions drawn fro m ana lys is of the 
successfu l and unsuccessful firms alone. Specifi call y, 
successful firn1s tended to combine ownership or outside 
representation w ith something else, whereas the 
unsuccessful finns e ither lacked one of these attributes 
(restating fin11S with low outsider percentages) or 
retained them independentl y. This impli es that, despite 
the putati ve benefi ts of incenti ve a lignment ari sing from 
eq uity ownership (Jensen & Meckling, 1976), ownership 
does not appear to improve governance individua lly; it 
must supp lement other characteri stics to be effective. 
T herefore, in promoting outside director equity, we may 
have sought to advance the project of govemance reforn1 
too fa r, at least to the extent ownership was viewed as a 
suffic ient source of effective control. Simil arly, reliance 
upon outside directors alone was a common feature of the 
unsuccessful firms that confi rms some theory (Baysinger 
& Hoskisson, 1990) advocati ng a ba lance of perspectives. 
T he results here thus highl ight the need to develop firnl-
and context-specific governance so lutions. 
CONCLlJSION 
T heory has advanced the notion that ce11ain 
governance form s and structures can be relied upon to 
work, and many such rules-based solutions have carried 
forward into the current re fo rm mo vement. Certainly , 
much has been made of the need for , among other things. 
independent. outs ide directors \\'i th appropriate 
compensation sys tems that bind their interests to those of 
shareho lders. One fi rm stand s out as an exemp lar of thi s 
mode l: Enron (Kocourek, Burger & Birchard . 2003; 
Kulik . 2005) . Although with hindsigh t we might question 
the extent to which the Enron directors were truly 
in dependent . at the time the compa ny's overall 
governance seemed consi -tent with general practice . 
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W hat, then, went wro ng? T he answer seems to li e in a 
te ndency to re ly upo n form and adherence to genera li zed 
norms, rather than to conduct the kind of firm-spec ifi c 
ana lys i that mi ght y ie ld be tter re ults . Indeed, the 
findin gs of thi s study suggest that our theoretica l 
understanding o f boa rd contro l should be augmented and 
adj usted to re n ee[ the c irc umstances present in indi vidua l 
cases. Thi re presents a s ign ificant cha ll enge for both 
practitioners and acade mi cs, for the sta kes are large. But 
understanding tha t genera l rul e may not be app licable to 
a ll contex ts is itse lf an important first step in des igning 
appropria te governa nce systems, and thi s is one of the 
primary contributio ns o f thi s resea rch. In additi on, the 
tudy hi ghlights so me o f the a reas that may hold promi se 
for future researc h and prac ti ce, inc lud ing the effects of 
tenure, espec ia ll y as it may be decomposed into different 
aspects in different c ircumstances, and the ap parent 
in e ffec ti veness of board equ ity ownershi p . Reliance upon 
ownership a lo ne, for exa mpl e, was not a characteri s ti c 
shared by the succe s fu l firm studi ed here. In tcad, a 
combina tion of a pproac hes seemed to be deve loped that 
in themse lves di ffe rcd by context. And contex t, rather 
than rules of thumb, c lea rl y must be the bas is of our 
so luti ons. 
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